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Abstract
This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in distribution chains in the presence of
win-win conditions. Revenue-sharing contracts are a mechanism to coordinate the firms
in a distribution chain. Under these contracts the retailer shares its revenue with the
supplier in exchange for a lower wholesale price. The win-win conditions are natural
conditions requiring that the profit of any firm may not decrease after implementing the
revenue-sharing contract. If these conditions are not met, that is, if at least one firm is
confronted with decreased profits, the firms will not agree upon signing the contract and
the revenue-sharing contract will not be implemented.
We show that the win-win conditions result in a smaller range of contracts being
offered by the supplier. More important, in case of multiple competing retailers there
may be no revenue-sharing contract satisfying these conditions. Hence, in the presence
of win-win conditions revenue-sharing contracts are not suitable for distribution chains
with a supplier and multiple competing retailers. For these chains we present a simple
alternative coordination mechanism that coordinates the chain and satisfies all win-win
conditions.
Key Words: coordination mechanism, revenue-sharing contract, win-win conditions, dis-
tribution chain.
2000 MSC : 90B50, 91A35
1 Introduction
Revenue-sharing contracts provide a mechanism to coordinate a distribution chain, which is
a supply chain consisting of a supplier and one or more retailers. The contracts are such that
the supplier charges the retailer a lower wholesale price per unit while the retailer transfers
a part of his revenues to the supplier. As a result, the retailers will order the chain-optimal
quantity from the supplier, that is, the distribution chain is coordinated. These contracts work
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particularly well in systems with a single selling season, like the video rental industry. This
application and its underlying basic model have been studied in various forms by [1, 2, 4, 5]
where it is shown to align the incentives of the retailers and coordinate the chain. Extensions
of these models are discussed in [3, 8].
Cachon and Lariviere [1] first study revenue-sharing contracts in case of a distribution
chain with a single retailer, and later extend it to multiple competing retailers. They show
that revenue-sharing contracts coordinate the channel and argue that they allow for arbitrary
divisions of the profits. The authors also state (in their Section 3.2) that a retailer is always
willing to participate because he can earn nonnegative profits. But should one not check
instead if the win-win conditions of the firms, or individual rationality as it is called in game
theory, are satisfied? These natural conditions say that the firms are only willing to sign a
(revenue-sharing) contract if they are not better off without it, that is, if the contract results in
non-decreased profits. Imposing these conditions seem more natural than considering whether
or not losses are avoided. We show that the win-win conditions result in a smaller range of
contracts offered by the supplier and consequently also in a smaller range of non-arbitrary
profits splits.
In case of multiple competing retailers, the reduced range of contracts may even be empty.
We present an example of Cournot-competition that shows this remarkable result. Hence, in
case of multiple retailers the win-win conditions may block any revenue-sharing contract. In
other words, for any revenue-sharing contract there is at least one firm that does not agree
upon signing the contract because its win-win condition is not met; the contract results in
lower profits for this firm. Thus, revenue-sharing contracts are not always suitable for a
chain with a supplier and multiple retailers. For such chains we present a simple alternative
coordination mechanism, based on the mechanisms in [9], that results in channel coordination
and in larger profits for all firms. Hence, the win-win conditions are always met.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 studies the effects of win-win conditions
for a distribution chain with a single retailer (Section 2.1) as well as for multiple retailers
(Section 2.2). It is shown that the range of contracts offered by the supplier is reduced
and this range may even be empty in case of multiple retailers. An alternative coordination
mechanism that always satisfies the win-win conditions is presented in Section 3.
2 Revenue-sharing contracts in the presence of win-win con-
ditions
In this section we study the effects of win-win conditions on revenue-sharing contracts. First
we consider distribution chains with a single retailer and thereafter chains with multiple
competing retailers are analysed. We follow the model as in [1].
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2.1 Distribution chains with a single retailer
Consider a distribution chain with a supplier and a retailer. Both firms are risk neutral. The
retailer orders q units of a product from the supplier. The supplier produces these goods
at a cost price c per unit and delivers them to the retailer at a wholesale price w per unit.
The retailer achieves an expected revenue R(q) from these products. This results in profit
functions
pir(q) = R(q)− wq
for the retailer and
pis(q) = (w − c)q
for the supplier. Because R(q) is assumed to be strictly concave and differentiable, the retailer
maximizes its profit in qd, which satisfies R′(qd) = w. This quantity is less than the chain-
optimal quantity due to the effect of double marginalization [6]. Hence, on its own the retailer
can achieve a maximal profit of
pir(qd) = R(qd)− wqd
while the supplier earns
pis(qd) = (w − c)qd.
If the firms wish to implement a contract than this should result in profits that are at least as
large as pir(qd) and pis(qd). These conditions (lower bounds) on the profits are the so-called
win-win conditions.
A revenue-sharing contract is a contract {φ,w(φ)} offered by the supplier to the retailer.
Its goal is to induce the retailer to buy more than the suboptimal quantity qd by offering a
lower wholesale price. In exchange the retailer should pay the supplier a part of his revenue.
The first parameter φ, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, in the contract is the fraction of retail revenue that the
retailer keeps while transferring the remainder, (1 − φ)R(q), to the supplier. The second
parameter w(φ) is the wholesale price offered to the retailer. To achieve coordination the
supplier will use w(φ) = φc (see [1] for details). No particular choice for φ is made. Under
this revenue-sharing contract the profit of the retailer equals
piRSr (q) = φR(q)− w(φ)q = φΠ(q),
where Π(q) = pir(q) + pis(q) denotes the total profit of the distribution chain. This total
profit is maximized in the chain-optimal quantity qI , which satisfies Π′(qI) = 0. The supplier
receives
piRSs (q) = (w(φ)− c)q + (1− φ)R(q) = (1− φ)Π(q).
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Maximizing the retailer’s profit piRSr is equivalent to maximizing the chain profit. Thus, the
retailer will order qI , resulting in a profit of piRSr (q
I) = φΠ(qI). The remainder of the chain
profit goes to the supplier, piRSs (q
I) = (1− φ)Π(qI).
In the presence of the win-win conditions the supplier can only offer contracts that result
in profits not lower than pir(qd) for the retailer and not lower than pis(qd) for himself. Thus,
the fraction φ should satisfy both
piRSr (q
I) = φΠ(qI) ≥ pir(qd)
and
piRSs (q
I) = (1− φ)Π(qI) ≥ pis(qd).
These inequalities boil down to
pir(qd)
Π(qI)
≤ φ ≤ 1− pis(q
d)
Π(qI)
. (1)
Notice that this is a nonempty range because pir(qd) + pis(qd) = Π(qd) < Π(qI). Further, it
is included in the interval [0, 1]. Thus, the win-win conditions result in a smaller range of
contracts being offered by the supplier. This proves the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 Consider a distribution chain with a supplier and a retailer. In the presence
of win-win conditions the supplier will only offer revenue-sharing contracts {φ,w(φ)} where
φ satisfies (1).
Hence, in the presence of win-win conditions the firms will agree upon a smaller number of
revenue-sharing contracts.
2.2 Distribution chains with multiple competing retailers
Consider now a distribution chain with a supplier and n competing retailers. Let qi denote
the order quantity of retailer i and let q¯ = (q1, . . . , qn) be the orders placed at the supplier.
The revenue of retailer i is Ri(q¯) and its wholesale price per unit is wi. Assume that Ri is a
continuous function that is unimodal in qi. The retailers compete because products of retailers
i and j are assumed to be substitutes: ∂Rii/∂qj ≤ 0 for all i 6= j, where Rji (q¯) = ∂Ri(q¯)/∂qj .
The unit cost of the supplier is c. Thus, the profits of the firms are
piri(q¯) = Ri(q¯)− wiqi
for retailer i and
pis(q¯) =
n∑
i=1
(wi − c)qi
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for the supplier. The sum of these profits is the total profit Π(q¯) of this distribution chain,
Π(q¯) =
n∑
i=1
Ri(q¯)− c
n∑
i=1
qi.
Retailer i maximizes its profit in qdi which satisfies R
i
i(q¯
d) = wi. Hence, on its own retailer i
can obtain a profit of
piri(q¯
d) = Ri(q¯d)− wiqdi
and the supplier earns
pis(q¯d) =
n∑
i=1
(wi − c)qdi .
These profit values will be the lower bounds in the win-win conditions.
Suppose the supplier offers retailer i a revenue-sharing contract {φ,wi(φ)}, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
Under this contract, the retailer transfers a fraction (1−φ) of his revenues to the supplier and
the supplier offers a wholesale price of wi(φ). As argued in [1], this contract will coordinate
the chain if wi(φ) = φwIi , for an arbitrary value of φ, where
wIi = c−
∑
j 6=i
Rij(q¯
I)
and where q¯I are the unique order quantities that maximize the total profit Π(q¯) of the chain.
Notice that implementing such a contract requires knowledge of all marginal revenues Rij .
This revenue-sharing contract results in profits
piRSri (q¯
I) = φ(Ri(q¯I)− wIi qIi ) = φpiri(q¯I , w¯I)
for retailer i, where, by slight abuse of notation, piri(q¯
I , w¯I) denotes the profit of retailer i
with wholesale prices w¯I = (wI1, . . . , w
I
n), and
piRSs (q¯
I) =
n∑
i=1
(φwIi − c)qIi +
n∑
i=1
(1− φ)Ri(q¯I) = (1− φ)Π(q¯I) + φpis(q¯I , w¯I)
for the supplier. In the presence of the win-win conditions, these profits should satisfy
piRSri (q¯
I) ≥ piri(q¯d) for all retailers and piRSs (q¯I) ≥ pis(q¯d) for the supplier. These inequali-
ties boil down to
max
i
piri(q¯
d)
piri(q¯I , w¯I)
≤ φ ≤ Π(q¯
I)− pis(q¯d)
Π(q¯I)− pis(q¯I , w¯I) . (2)
Notice that this range is included in the interval [0, 1]. We have proved the following Theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Consider a distribution chain with a supplier and n competing retailers. In the
presence of win-win conditions the supplier will only offer revenue-sharing contracts {φ,wi(φ)}
where φ satisfies (2).
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Unfortunately, the range (2) for φ may be empty, opposed to the range (1) in case of a single
retailer. In other words, there exist revenue-sharing contracts in which at least one of the
firms is confronted with lower profits. The example below illustrates this remarkable finding
for a distribution chain with two retailers who are engaged in Cournot competition [7].
Example 2.3 Consider a distribution chain with a supplier and two competing retailers.
The retailers are engaged in Cournot competition, that is, they compete through quantities.
If retailer 1 has q1 units for sale and retailer 2 q2 units then the revenue for retailer 1 is given
by R1(q¯) = q1(13 − q1 − 3q2) while retailer 2 earns a revenue of R2(q¯) = q2(11 − 3q1 − q2).
Notice that these revenue functions satisfy all assumptions in [1, Section 3.2]. Assume further
that w1 = w2 = 2 and c = 1. Under these circumstances the retailers will order q¯d = (1, 3)
and the profits of the firms are pir1(q¯
d) = 1, pir2(q¯
d) = 9 and pis(q¯d) = 4.
Next, the supplier offers retailer i a revenue-sharing contract {φ,wi(φ)} where wi(φ) =
φwIi , w
I
1 = 47/8 and w
I
2 = 35/8. The optimal solution of the chain is q¯
I = (9/8, 13/8),
resulting in pir1(q¯
I , w¯I) = 81/64, pir2(q¯
I , w¯I) = 169/64, pis(q¯I , w¯I) = 351/32 and Π(q¯I) =
119/8.
According to (2), a revenue-sharing contract satisfies the win-win conditions if
max
{
64
81
,
576
169
}
=
576
169
≤ φ ≤ 348
125
.
But this will never happen because 576/169 > 348/125. Thus, there exists no revenue-
sharing contract that satisfies all the win-win conditions. Also notice that the lower bound of
φ, 576/169, is larger than 1. This lower bound is due to retailer 2 who is always faced with
a lower profit because pir2(q¯
I , w¯I) < pir2(q¯
d). 
This example shows a distribution chain with a supplier and two retailers who will never agree
upon a revenue-sharing contract because any such contract makes at least one of them worse
off. To achieve coordination of such chains asks for other mechanisms than revenue-sharing
contracts.
3 A coordination mechanism satisfying the win-win conditions
In a distribution chain with multiple retailers without coordination, any retailer orders a
quantity different from the chain-optimal solution, qdi 6= qIi . Hence, to achieve coordination
starting from the solution q¯d, the supplier has to undertake some action. The following
mechanism is based on the mechanisms in [9] that coordinate inventory control in serial and
distribution systems.
The supplier starts by asking retailer i to order a quantity qi different from qdi . If the
retailer would do so, his profits would decrease by piri(q¯
d)− piri(q¯). This term is nonnegative
because the retailer’s profit piri(q¯) is maximised in q¯
d. But this profit decrease will certainly
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not persuade the retailer to fulfill the request of the supplier. Hence, the supplier has to offer
the retailer a full compensation for this decrease in profits. This compensation should act
as a first incentive for the retailer to order a quantity different from qdi , as requested by the
supplier. After these compensations the new profits of the firms are
piri(q¯) + (piri(q¯
d)− piri(q¯)) = piri(q¯d)
for retailer i and
pis(q¯)−
n∑
i=1
(piri(q¯
d)− piri(q¯)) = Π(q¯)−
n∑
i=1
piri(q¯
d)
for the supplier. A straightforward effect of the change of order quantities is that the profit
of the supplier changes by pis(q¯)−pis(q¯d). The compensations paid to the retailers reduce this
extra profit of the supplier to
pis(q¯)− pis(q¯d)−
n∑
i=1
(piri(q¯
d)− piri(q¯)) = Π(q¯)−Π(q¯d).
Call this value the surplus of the supplier. To persuade the retailers to fulfill his request of
changing the order quantities, the supplier offers retailer i a fraction αi of his surplus, where
αi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 αi < 1. These bounds on the αi’s are strict to ensure that each firm receives
a part of the surplus. Distributing the surplus, which is the second and final incentive for the
retailer, results in a profit of
piri(q¯
d) + αi(Π(q¯)−Π(q¯d)) (3)
for retailer i. This retailer maximizes its profit if the total profit Π(q¯) of the chain is max-
imized. Therefore, the retailers will order the optimal quantity q¯I . This implies that the
surplus becomes Π(q¯I) − Π(q¯d) > 0. Consequently, the new profit of retailer i, piri(q¯d) +
αi(Π(q¯I) − Π(q¯d)), is larger than the initial profit piri(q¯d). The win-win conditions of the
retailers are satisfied.
After distributing parts of the surplus, the profit of the supplier becomes
Π(q¯)−
n∑
i=1
piri(q¯
d)−
n∑
i=1
αi(Π(q¯)−Π(q¯d)) = pis(q¯d) + (1−
n∑
i=1
αi)(Π(q¯)−Π(q¯d)). (4)
Under q¯ = q¯I this profit equals
pis(q¯d) + (1−
n∑
i=1
αi)(Π(q¯I)−Π(q¯d)),
which is larger than pis(q¯d); the win-win condition of the supplier is also satisfied. The
following theorem summarizes the above results.
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Theorem 3.1 Consider a distribution chain with a supplier and n competing retailers. Sup-
pose the supplier uses the following coordination mechanism. He asks the retailers to change
their order quantities from qdi to qi in exchange for a full compensation of any decreases of
profits as well as a part of the supplier’s surplus. This coordination mechanism results in profit
functions (3) for the retailers and (4) for the supplier. The retailers maximize their profits
by ordering q¯I , which results in a coordinated distribution chain. Further, all the win-win
conditions are met.
Hence, this coordination mechanism always satisfies the win-win conditions. Notice that this
mechanism also works if there is only a single retailer. Below we apply this coordination
mechanism to the example in the previous section, where revenue-sharing contracts failed to
meet the win-win conditions.
Example 3.2 Consider the distribution chain as in Example 2.3. According to (3), the
coordination mechanism results in the profit
1 + α1(Π(q¯)− 14)
for retailer 1 and
9 + α2(Π(q¯)− 14)
for retailer 2, which are maximized in q¯ = q¯I = (9/8, 13/8). Substituting Π(q¯I) = 119/8 leads
to the profits 1 + 7α1/8 for retailer 1 and 9 + 7α2/8 for retailer 2. These profits are larger
than the profits under decentralized control, 1 and 9 respectively, because αi > 0. Given the
order quantities q¯I the profit of the supplier equals 4+ (1−α1−α2)7/8, which is larger than
4 = pis(q¯d) because α1 + α2 < 1. Hence, the profit levels resulting from the coordination
mechanism satisfy all the win-win conditions. 
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